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Summary
The ability to classify visual objects into discrete cate-
gories (‘‘friend’’ versus ‘‘foe’’; ‘‘edible’’ versus ‘‘poi-
sonous’’) is essential for survival and is a fundamental
cognitive function. The cortical substrates that medi-
ate this function, however, have not been identified in
humans. To identify brain regions involved in stimulus
categorization, we developed a task in which subjects
classified stimuli according to a variable categorical
boundary. Psychophysical functions were used to de-
fine a decision variable, categorization uncertainty,
which was systematically manipulated. Using event-
related functional MRI, we discovered that activity
in a fronto-striatal-thalamic network, consisting of
the medial frontal gyrus, anterior insula, ventral stria-
tum, and dorsomedial thalamus, was modulated by
categorization uncertainty. We found this network
to be distinct from the frontoparietal attention net-
work, consisting of the frontal and parietal eye fields,
where activity was not correlated with categorization
uncertainty.
Introduction
Categorization of objects into distinct classes is central
to decisions that affect survival. To categorize an ap-
proaching animal as ‘‘dangerous’’ or ‘‘innocuous,’’ for
example, may depend on the animal’s distance. In this
case, one attends to the relevant dimension (distance)
and then compares it to an internal criterion demarcat-
ing ‘‘danger.’’ Furthermore, the categorical boundary
must be sensitive to context: is the tiger three feet away
in a jungle, or in a zoo? Categorization is thus a critical
and dynamic aspect of decision-making, yet the neural
mechanisms by which this comparison process occurs
are not well understood.
One of the challenges in decision-making research
in general has been to determine which variables are
neurally encoded, and how this information is then used.
Single unit studies in nonhuman primates have focused
on cortical areas that are part of a frontoparietal at-
tention network (Posner and Petersen, 1990), particu-
larly the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) in the posterior
parietal cortex (PPC) and the frontal eye fields (FEF) in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These stud-
ies have identified decision variables related to signal
*Correspondence: jg2269@columbia.edudetection, accumulation of evidence, response selec-
tion, and outcome evaluation (Schall and Hanes, 1993;
Hanes and Schall, 1996; Kim and Shadlen, 1999;
Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Mazurek et al., 2003; Platt
and Glimcher, 1999). Studies that have looked explicitly
at categorization (Freedman et al., 2001, 2003) have
found evidence for category-specific neuronal re-
sponses in the lateral prefrontal cortex; it is possible
that the role of such neurons is to establish a categorical
boundary or to be involved in the comparison process
necessary for making a categorical decision.
To identify neural activation related to stimulus cate-
gorization, we developed an event-related fMRI task
(Figure1) inwhichsubjects categorized astimulus,which
varied continuously along a single dimension, into one
of two categories. To accurately perform this categori-
zation, subjects had to compare the stimulus to an ab-
stract categorical boundary, such that the difficulty of
the comparison process was inversely proportional to
the distance of the stimulus from that boundary. In other
words, the closer the stimulus was to the boundary, the
greater the categorization uncertainty became. We
hypothesized that BOLD activity related to the compar-
ison process would be proportional to categorization
uncertainty. We provide evidence that the neural sub-
strate for comparing a stimulus to a categorical bound-
ary includes the medial frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior
insula (AI), ventral striatum (VS), and dorsomedial thala-
mus (dmTh).
Results
Subjects performed a task in which they judged a vertical
line segment to be long or short relative to one of two cri-
terion lengths. The criterion lengths were not shown
explicitly to the subjects but were learned through feed-
back. On each trial, one criterion was chosen at random,
and this was represented by a symbolic cue (colored cir-
cle) presented at the beginning of the trial. To character-
ize a psychophysical variable related to categorization,
we constructed psychometric functions (Figure 2A; Fig-
ure S5A in the Supplemental Data available with this
article online) for subjects’ evaluation of line lengths,
sorting responses according to length and cue color.
Rectifying the psychometric functions around the point
of subjective equality (PSE) created a function that pro-
vided an estimate of subjective uncertainty (the uncer-
tainty function) (Figure 2A; Figure S5A).
This function could reflect uncertainty either at the
signal detection stage or at the categorization stage of
the decision-making process. We hypothesized that the
latter was more likely the case, as the stimuli were all
highly discriminable. To confirm this, we asked subjects
to perform the same categorization task with the red/
green cue (symbolic criterion condition) replaced by a
line segment equal in length to the categorical boundary
(explicit criterion condition).
If the ability to detect changes in stimulus length (i.e.,
signal detection) had been the primary source of deci-
sion uncertainty in the subject’s performance, then the
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758Figure 1. Experimental Design
(Top) Subjects were presented with one of
two cues. After a delay, a line segment was
presented, and subjects indicated whether
the line appeared ‘‘long’’ or ‘‘short’’ relative
to the categorical boundary (CB) indicated
by the cue. The line remained on screen until
the subject responded. A tone indicated
whether the response was correct or incor-
rect. (Bottom) The black circle (actual cue
was red) represented a CB located between
stimulus 5 and stimulus 6 (dashed line); the
gray circle (actual cue was green) repre-
sented a CB between stimulus 11 and stimu-
lus 12. For example, if the gray cue is pre-
sented, stimuli 1–11 are ‘‘short,’’ while
stimuli 12–16 are ‘‘long.’’ To minimize learning
effects in the scanner, subjects learned to as-
sociate the cue with its CB over the course of
1000 prescanning practice trials.psychometric functions would be the same in the explicit
and the symbolic criterion conditions. If, however, the
representation of the internal decision criterion had been
the primary source of decision uncertainty in perfor-
mance, then the psychometric functions of the explicit
criterion task would be characterized by smaller Weber
fractions than in the symbolic criterion task. In fact,
across all subjects, the largest Weber fraction observed
in the explicit criterion task was three times smaller than
the smallest Weber fraction in the symbolic criterion
task, indicating that the limiting factor in the main task
was indeed the representation of the decision criterion,
not the visual discrimination of the stimulus itself.
We predicted that cortical areas containing categori-
zation-related neurons would present BOLD responses
with magnitude modulated by per-trial uncertainty. This
signal should represent processes related to the com-
parison of a stimulus against an abstract categorical
boundary, including categorization-specific attention,
category rule application, and category-related memory
retrieval processes. In contrast, non-categorization re-
gions involved in processing other aspects of the
decision—such assignal detection, non-decision-related
attention, motor planning, etc.—should have constant
response magnitudes across all trials, reflecting the sta-
bility of these variables.
Neural activity during the decision was modeled using
two regressors. One regressor, the unmodulated re-
sponse time regressor, was aligned with stimulus onset
and had a duration equal to the subject’s response time
on each trial. Prior to convolution with the hemodynamic
response function (HRF), the height of this regressor
was constant across all trials (Figure S2). The other re-
gressor, the uncertainty regressor, was also equal in du-
ration to the response time but varied in amplitude from
trial to trial depending on the value of the uncertainty
function for the given stimulus. Thus, after convolution
with the HRF, the amplitude of the uncertainty regressor
reflected both the response time and the uncertainty for
each trial.
Activity that was significantly correlated with the un-
modulated regressor was widely distributed across the
entire brain (Figure S4A). In contrast, activity modulatedby categorization uncertainty was found in MFG and
AI, and VS and dmTh (Figure 3), but not in the PPC or
DLPFC.
To confirm that PPC and DLPFC were not related to
categorization uncertainty, we identified regions of in-
terest (ROIs) in the frontoparietal oculomotor/attentional
network (Posner and Petersen, 1990) using a center-out
saccade task (Figure 4A). These ROIs fit within the
‘‘empty’’ or uncorrelated regions of the uncertainty acti-
vation map (Figure 4B). This result suggests that the
MFG-AI-VS-dmTh network is spatially and functionally
distinct from the frontoparietal attentional network.
The regression model used to identify activation cor-
related to decision uncertainty is sensitive to the corre-
lation between individual regressors. Because subjects’
response times were partially correlated with psycho-
physical uncertainty (Figure 2B; r = 0.342; n = 10), it
was impossible to construct a model in which uncer-
tainty and reaction time were not correlated. We there-
fore performed an alternate analysis that did not depend
on linear regression. In this analysis, we computed
event-triggered averages of the HRFs aligned with stim-
ulus onset within ROIs identified by the regression
model. To break the correlation between uncertainty
and response time, we restricted this analysis to trials
with response times confined to a 200 ms window (Fig-
ure S5B). Since typical response times ranged from
500 ms to 2500 ms, the use of a small response time
window minimized the correlation between response
time and uncertainty (r = 0.094; n = 10), allowing us to
evaluate the effect of categorization uncertainty on the
BOLD response while effectively holding response time
constant.
We created ROI masks from the thresholded acti-
vation maps and measured time-dependent BOLD
changes within those masks for the response time-
constrained subset of trials. The trials were further sub-
divided into low (0–0.33), medium (0.34–0.66), and high
(0.67–1.0) psychophysical uncertainty. Figure 5A shows
the percent signal change for each trial type. Whereas
the BOLD response in the categorization network was
modulated by uncertainty, no such relationship was ob-
served in the oculomotor/attentional regions.
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Decision-making is often treated as a unitary cognitive
function; however, it is likely that even simple decisions
involve an aggregation of several distinct subprocesses
Figure 2. Psychometric and Uncertainty Functions
(A) Trials were sorted to create percent ‘‘long’’ responses as a func-
tion of stimulus length in pixels (top panel). The two curves corre-
spond to the two cues (black and gray), respectively, for one typical
subject. The psychophysical data were acquired simultaneously with
the fMRI data. To create uncertainty functions (bottom panel), each
psychometric function was rectified around the PSE and normalized
such that the range varied from 0 to 1. Thus, by definition, the PSE has
maximum uncertainty and the endpoint stimuli have minimum uncer-
tainty. Each stimulus can have variable uncertainty depending on
which cue preceded it (although the biggest differences in uncer-
tainty between the two cues are near the categorical boundaries).
(B) The mean linear correlation coefficient between RT and uncer-
tainty is 0.342 (n = 10). The relationship between uncertainty and re-
action time, however, is not linear. There is no significant difference in
this relationship between the two cues. Error bars represent stan-
dard error across ten subjects. that includes signal detection, categorization, motor
planning, and outcome evaluation. In the context of
sensory-motor behavior, categorization may be an es-
sential stage linking signal detection and motor planning,
particularly when the mapping between stimulus and
motor response is contingent on behavioral context.
Several prior studies have used functional imaging to
Figure 3. Activity Correlated to Categorization Uncertainty
Group (mixed effects) analysis of ten subjects, w750 trials/subject
(Z threshold at p < 0.05, resel corrected). (A) The network of uncer-
tainty-related areas consists of the medial frontal gyrus (MFG), ante-
rior insula (AI), ventral striatum (VS), and dorsomedial thalamus
(dmTh). (B) The unthresholded Z statistic map demonstrates the un-
derlying correlational structure of the brain activity. Blue indicates
negatively correlated activity (Z <21.6), red indicates positively cor-
related activity (Z > 1.6), and black/white indicates the 95% confi-
dence interval (21.96 < Z > 1.96), which contains voxels that are
not correlated to uncertainty. This figure illustrates that the result
in (A) is not a product of fortuitous thresholding. Cross hairs intersect
at the same point in all slices (MNI152: 0, 30,24). The unthresholded
map is superimposed on a gray outline of an average brain; the solid
gray represents regions that were not scanned in all subjects.
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760investigate the role of uncertainty in decision-making,
though none has specifically focused on uncertainty re-
lated to categorization (Huettel et al., 2005; Volz et al.,
2003, 2004; Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2002).
These studies have instead demonstrated that, by vary-
ing the probability with which a stimulus or response
occurs, one can modulate activity in several regions of
the frontal and parietal cortex (including LIP, MFG, AI,
FEF, SEF, ACC, DLPFC, and VMPFC). The present work,
however, distinguishes categorization uncertainty from
other decision variables and provides evidence that this
form of uncertainty modulates activity in a frontal-striatal
loop.
To the extent that decision uncertainty is correlated
with response time, our results are consistent with pre-
vious reports. In the present study, however, we took
several steps to dissociate the categorical act from non-
categorization processes present during the response
time. By explicitly modeling response times, we ac-
counted for non-categorization-related differences be-
tween trial types. Furthermore, we segregated activity
with constant intensity across trials (unmodulated re-
gressor) from activity with intensity modulated by cate-
gorization uncertainty (uncertainty regressor). While the
former consists of a variety of cognitive processes, the
latter is likely to represent the comparison process itself.
The network of brain regions where activation was
correlated with uncertainty after controlling for response
time (MFG, AI, VS, dmTh) represents a classic basal
Figure 4. Attention and Categorization Networks Are Spatially Dis-
sociated
Activation map (p < 0.05, resel corrected) for a simple center-out
saccade task (left) shows that eye movements elicit activity in the
frontal eye fields, supplementary eye fields, and parietal eye fields.
The outlines of the activation clusters are overlaid on the unthre-
sholded Z statistic map of the uncertainty regressor, in which blue
indicates negative correlation with uncertainty (Z < 21.6), red indi-
cates positive correlation (Z < 1.6), and gray indicates the 95% con-
fidence interval (21.96 < Z < 1.96) in which activity is not correlated
to uncertainty. The saccade activity overlay fits almost perfectly into
the gray regions of the unthresholded activation map, indicating that
the areas involved in directing spatial attention/oculomotor control
are not correlated to categorization uncertainty and are therefore
not involved in making categorical judgments.ganglia-thalamocortical loop (Alexander and Crutcher,
1990). Converging neuropsychological and neuroimag-
ing evidence has been used to construct a model of cat-
egory learning that involves the prefrontal cortex, basal
ganglia, anterior cingulate, and thalamus (Maddox and
Ashby, 2004; Ashby and Maddox, 2005). Freedman
et al. (2003) have suggested that the mapping of a stim-
ulus to abstract categories occurs throughout the frontal
cortex, whereas the temporal lobe is involved in the pro-
cessing of the physical properties of the stimulus. We
found that two areas in the frontal cortex are involved
in processing categorical information, MFG (BA8) and
AI. BA8 has been shown to be active in a variety of tasks
that involve cognitive control, preresponse conflict, and
decision uncertainty (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). In fact,
these types of tasks show increased activity throughout
the medial wall of the frontal cortex, including areas
Figure 5. Hemodynamic Responses
(A) Percent BOLD signal change for trials within a 200 ms response
time window. The response time window for each subject was
chosen so as to maximize the total number of high-uncertainty trials.
However, the results were the same for three other nonoverlapping
windows (see Figure S6). Black, brown, and red represent low,
medium, and high uncertainty, respectively. Error bars represent
standard error. The oculomotor/attention brain regions show no sig-
nificant modulation by categorization uncertainty. However, AI, VS,
and MFG all show a positive correlation with uncertainty.
(B) To quantify this relationship, we computed the area under the
BOLD response curve over the first 8 s. The integral of the BOLD re-
sponse as a function of uncertainty clearly shows a monotonically
increasing relationship in AI, VS, and MFG.
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761Figure 6. Extended Diffusion Model
The model explicitly represents three state
variables. Proximity to categorical boundary
is encoded as the rate of the diffusion pro-
cess. Accumulated evidence is the time inte-
gral of the diffusion rate. Decision uncertainty
is the time integral of the accumulated evi-
dence. The model predicts that response
times are proportional to decision uncertainty
and explains how response times can vary
when stimulus strength remains constant.BA6, BA8, BA24, and BA32. In our case, we found that
the unmodulated regressor shows increased activity in
all of these regions; however, the uncertainty activation
was found only in BA8. The anterior cingulate (BA24;
Figure 3B), the supplementary eye fields (BA6; Figure 4),
and the DLPFC (BA46/9; Figure 4) showed no activity
correlated with uncertainty after taking response time
into account.
The AI is part of the orbitofrontal cortex and has wide-
spread efferent and afferent projections to and from both
the frontal and parietal cortices (Mesulam and Mufson,
1982a, 1982b), suggesting that it participates in the inte-
gration of multimodal information. It has been sug-
gested to be involved in the processing of reward value
and hedonic experience (Kringelbach, 2005). Studies
have shown that the AI is correlated with subjective
pleasantness ratings of food (Kringelbach et al., 2003),
predicted reward value of odors (Gottfried et al., 2003),
intensity of pain (Wager et al., 2004), and fairness of eco-
nomic offers (Sanfey et al., 2003). All of these studies
modulated the reward value of the stimulus, but sub-
jects were also required to categorize the stimulus along
a given dimension. Furthermore, a number of studies of
decision-making have shown insular activity in the ab-
sence of reward modulation and/or minimal integration
demands (Huettel et al., 2005; Volz et al., 2003, 2004;
Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2002). Thus, there
are at least two hypotheses for explaining activity in
the AI. In our task, AI activation was correlated with cat-
egorization uncertainty even though reward value was
not modulated.
The VS has been shown to be modulated by predict-
ability of reward. Berns et al. (2001) showed that VS in-
creases activity when rewards became less predictable,
a result consistent with models of dopamine release
(Schultz et al., 1997). Category learning models have
also involved the basal ganglia (Maddox and Ashby,
2004). It is possible that the VS provides an instructive
signal necessary for the adjustment of a categorical
boundary when uncertainty is high. Such a strategy
would allow subjects to minimize errors by maintaining
accurate category boundaries.
Relationship of Imaging Results to Single
Neuron Studies
Single neuron recordings in behaving animals have been
used to identify activity associated with a number of
decision processes. An emerging theme has been that
decision-making is correlated with sustained neural ac-
tivity that is integrated over time. Studies in inferior pari-
etal lobule (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) and DLPFC
(Kim and Shadlen, 1999), for instance, have shown that
activity accumulates over time, with a rate proportionalto signal strength; and this build-up activity is a good
predictor of oculomotor response times (Hanes and
Schall, 1996).
These results have lent support to models in which bi-
nary decisions are treated as a random walk or a race
between two competing signal accumulators (Usher
and McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Ratcliff
et al., 2003): when enough evidence has been collected
by one of the accumulators, a response is selected. This
type of model correctly predicts that response times are
negatively correlated with signal strength. Signal detec-
tion models predict that general decision regions of the
brain should become more active as the decision be-
comes easier (Heekeren et al., 2004). Indeed, a positive
correlation between signal strength and neural activity is
expected for brain regions involved in signal detection.
However, these types of models have not been able
to explain how response times can vary when signal
strength is constant, nor do they account for neural ac-
tivity that is positively correlated with response time.
Categorization-related brain regions, however, should
show a different pattern of activity, especially when sig-
nal strength is constant and above threshold. In fact,
single cell recordings have shown the existence of cate-
gory selective neurons that fire earlier and with higher
frequency the closer the stimulus is to the categorical
boundary (Freedman et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2003).
Our data suggest that decision uncertainty can be dis-
sociated from stimulus discriminability, both psycho-
physically and neurally. Our data also provide evidence
for neural activation that increases with response time.
To account for these observations, we propose a simple
extension of the standard diffusion model (Figure 6). By
integrating the accumulated evidence over time, it is
possible to create a variable that we call decision effort,
which increases as the rate of evidence accumulation
decreases. Such a model can explain how response
times can increase while stimulus strength remains con-
stant and how decreasing information can create more
neural activity (i.e., a larger load on the categorization
process). This extension of the standard diffusion model
is natural because it involves nothing more than the re-
peated application of neural time integration, a well-
established neurocomputational principle (Aksay et al.,
2001; Mazurek et al., 2003). The model provides a means
for monitoring the rate of evidence accumulation, which
may be important in assigning confidence to the out-
come of the evidence accumulation process.
Experimental Procedures
Experiments were performed on ten adult subjects (five females;
ages: 18–34) who provided informed consent according to guide-
lines approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Columbia
Neuron
762University and the New York State Psychiatric Institute. All had nor-
mal vision.
Psychophysics
Prior to scanning, each subject was trained on the task outside the
scanner. Stimuli were presented on a calibrated 21 in CRT monitor
with a resolution of 16003 1200 pixels and frame rate of 75 Hz. Sub-
jects were seated comfortably with their head in a chinrest at a view-
ing distance of 36 in. Subjects responded by pressing a key on a
numeric keypad (USB interface). Both the identity of the key and
the time at which it was pressed were recorded. Stimulus generation
and response collection were managed using the Psychophysics
Toolbox running under Matlab 5.2 on a G4 Macintosh computer
(OS 9.2). This combination of software and hardware was tested to
ensure precise timing control over stimuli and responses. Auditory
feedback was provided to indicate a correct (high tone) or incorrect
(low tone) response.
Subject’s responses were sorted to produce psychometric func-
tions indicating the percentage of trials on which the stimulus was
categorized as ‘‘long’’ as a function of physical stimulus length in
pixels. The psychometric functions were fit with Weibull (Quick,
1974) functions of the following form:
ð1Þ percent long = 12 2ðx=mÞ3
The parameters m and 3 were fit by maximum likelihood estima-
tion. The uncertainty function was defined as follows:
ð2Þ uncertainty =








0:52 2ð
x
mÞ3




20:5




j
where 4 was equal to the value of the uncertainty at the PSE. The
PSE was defined as the stimulus length for which percent long = per-
cent short = 50%. We defined a discrimination threshold, or just
noticeable difference (jnd), DL, as half the difference between the
25% and 75% correct points on the psychometric function. We
also defined a Weber fraction, DL/L, as the jnd divided by the PSE.
Response times were measured as the time (in ms) elapsed between
the onset of the test stimulus and the registration of the key press.
To minimize learning-related effects over the course of the exper-
iment, subjects performed 1000 trials (100 trials per session) outside
the scanner over the course of a week prior to starting the fMRI scan-
ning sessions. Performance on the task reached asymptotic levels
after approximately 200 to 300 trials. Subjects performed one prac-
tice run within the scanner prior to data collection. Each subject was
scanned 10 times. The series of scans for each subject took place
within a 3–6 week period with no more than one session per day.
Psychophysical thresholds were compared between the fMRI and
the psychophysics experiments to confirm that the tasks were
equally difficult.
During the fMRI experiment, stimuli were presented using a cali-
brated LCD projector (Sanyo PLCXP30) at a resolution of 1280 3
1024 pixels and a frame rate of 75 Hz. Stimuli were generated and re-
sponses collected using the Psychophysics Toolbox running under
Matlab 5.2 on a G4 Macintosh computer (OS 9.2). Auditory feedback
was provided via MR-compatible headphones. Stimulus size was
adjusted to match the stimuli in the psychophysics experiments.
The cue stimuli were red and green circles, 5.0º in diameter and
0.2º thick. The colors were matched for luminance. The line stimuli
were black, vertically oriented line segments, 4 pixels wide, 40–70
pixels long, ranging from 0.4º to 0.7º in height against a gray back-
ground. The line segments were blurred by filtering with a 2D Gauss-
ian blur function of the following form:
ð3Þ Gðx; yÞ = e2
ðx2 x0Þ2 + ðy2 y0Þ2
s2
where s is the space constant of the blur function. An individualized
blur was applied to each subject’s stimulus set to make the task
of roughly equal difficulty (as measured by the Weber fraction)
across subjects. The stimulus set was also adjusted such that
it spanned a broad range of high, medium, and low values of
uncertainty.fMRI Imaging
Imaging experiments were conducted using a 1.5T GE Scanner us-
ing a standard GE birdcage head coil. A bite bar was used to mini-
mize head motion. Structural scans were performed using the 3D
SPGR sequence (124 slices; 256 3 256; FOV = 200 mm). Functional
scans were performed using EPI bold (TE = 50; TR = 1.6; 17 slices;
643 64; FOV = 200 mm; voxel size = 3 mm3 3 mm3 5.5 mm). Slices
were positioned to cover the frontal and parietal lobes on all sub-
jects. Some subjects had brains larger than the z axis FOV
(94 mm), which resulted in no coverage in the most ventral portions
of the occipital and temporal lobe. We only report activity for voxels
common to all ten subjects.
All analysis was done using the FMRIB Software Library (FSL;
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/index.html). Preprocessing consisted
of motion correction (McFlirt), brain extraction (BET), high-pass fil-
tering (>50 s), and spatial filtering (FWHM = 5 mm). Standard statis-
tical parametric mapping techniques (FEAT) were performed in orig-
inal T2* space. Multiple linear regression was used to identify voxels
that correlated with specific behavioral events. Activation thresh-
olds were set at p = 0.05, resel corrected. Second level analyses
were performed in standard MNI152 space by applying the registra-
tion transformation matrices to the parameter estimates. In order to
maximize the statistical power of the event-related fMRI data analy-
sis, the stimuli were presented with a temporal jitter. The two ISIs
and ITI were uniformly distributed across values from 1 to 4 s. This
results in a mean ISI and ITI equal to 2.5 s. Recent work (Wager
and Nichols, 2003) suggests that ITIs of 2.5 s have high efficiency
for parameter estimation.
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data include Supplemental Results, six supple-
mental figures, and two supplemental tables and can be found
with this article online at http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/
49/5/757/DC1/.
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